ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE AND PROSPECTS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR OF UKRAINE

Abstract

The escalation of cyberattacks as a key component of hybrid warfare poses significant challenges to the security of state information systems. In the context of ongoing military aggression against Ukraine and large-scale attacks targeting critical infrastructure, the traditional perimeter-based security model has proven insufficient under conditions of blurred network boundaries and widespread adoption of cloud technologies and remote access. A promising alternative is the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), built on the principles of "never trust, always verify," least privilege access, and continuous monitoring. The aim of this study is to substantiate an adapted ZTA implementation model for Ukrainian government networks, considering national regulatory requirements, limited financial and human resources, and heightened risks during hybrid aggression. The paper provides an overview of leading international frameworks, including NIST SP 800-207, CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model, and NCSC Design Principles, and identifies key barriers to their application in Ukraine. These barriers include outdated infrastructure, regulatory inconsistencies, insufficient personnel expertise, and restricted budgets. The proposed conceptual model incorporates a phased implementation strategy across five layers: identity and access management, dynamic access control, network microsegmentation, data protection, and continuous monitoring with behavioral analytics. The model also integrates federated identity management, multi-factor authentication, contextual risk-based access control, and centralized monitoring via SIEM and SOAR platforms. The expected result is an increased level of cyber resilience in government networks without a significant reduction in usability, ensuring compliance with national cybersecurity standards and readiness for hybrid threats.